Anything and Everything is Monetized
Enshittification refers to the process by which online platforms start by offering high-quality services to attract users. As these platforms grow, they gradually degrade the quality of their offerings to better serve business customers, and finally, they compromise service to both users and businesses to maximize shareholder returns. Essentially, it illustrates a cycle of decline in which platforms first serve their users, then shift their focus to business clients, ultimately abandoning user satisfaction altogether.
In reality, enshittification has always existed, especially in the tech industry, but at a much slower pace. Thirty years ago, Version 1 of a product was often the very best because it was overbuilt. The firmware had bugs but the overall experience was good enough that users waited for V2 hoping it would be a real improvement. Then, about 20 years ago, V1 was generally good because the engineers and assembly line workers still had pride in making good products. Firmware fixes added more features and fixed bugs. Ten years ago, the norm became to add features that may or may not add value but justified increasing the price. Today, nothing is done without increasing the bottom line.
In this post, I use Walmart Financial Services as an example of IRL enshittification but just about any firm goes through the same process. Making money is the one and only American goal.
Enshittification + Walmart Financial Services (WFS) fraud – a combined view
| Enshittification stage | What happened at Walmart Financial Services | How that created fraud opportunities |
|---|---|---|
| 1️⃣ Growth / user‑centric (early rollout) | WFS entered the market with low‑fee money‑transfer, prepaid‑card, and “credit‑builder” products aimed at under‑banked shoppers. The promise was convenience inside a familiar retail environment. | Strong focus on onboarding and trust‑building meant relatively robust customer‑service and simple fraud‑prevention checks. |
| 2️⃣ Monetisation / power consolidation (2020‑2022) | As transaction volume grew, Walmart pushed higher interchange fees, added third‑party partners (MoneyGram, RIA, Western Union) and introduced new fee‑laden services. Cost‑cutting led to less employee training, weaker internal controls, and greater reliance on outsourced processing. | • Data silos – huge amounts of PII and transaction data spread across internal and external systems. • Third‑party exposure – partners often lacked Walmart‑level security standards. |
| 3️⃣ Degradation / fraud explosion (2022‑present) | Customer experience deteriorated: opaque fees, delayed transfers, and poor dispute resolution. Internal audits revealed that “fraudulent activity accounted for 25‑75 % of money‑transfer traffic at some stores”propublica.org. The FTC’s amended complaint states Walmart “knew its services were used by fraudsters” and failed to train staff or warn customersftc.gov. | • Scammer‑friendly environment – weak authentication on prepaid‑card portals allowed unauthorized transfers. • Synthetic‑identity abuse – fraudsters created fake profiles to obtain “credit‑builder” loans, then defaulted or cashed outreddit.com. • Fee harvesting – Walmart collected millions in fees while scammers siphoned off funds, a classic profit‑over‑protection signal of enshittificationpropublica.org. |
Why the enshittification curve fuels fraud
- Profit‑first incentives – Once the platform’s revenue depends heavily on transaction volume, the organization may prioritise speed and cost over rigorous fraud checks.
- Outsourced risk controls – Third‑party processors become the weak link; if they are not held to the same standards, scammers can exploit gaps.
- User‑experience erosion – Confusing fee structures and slow dispute handling reduce customer vigilance, making it easier for fraudsters to slip through unnoticed.
Concrete fraud signals reported
- FTC complaint (June 2023): Walmart allowed scammers to use its money‑transfer services, resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars lost by consumersftc.gov.
- ProPublica investigation (2023): Stores showed 25‑75 % fraudulent money‑transfer activity; Walmart allegedly “pocketed millions in fees while letting fraudsters fleece its customers”propublica.org.
- Corporate fraud alerts: Walmart’s own alerts warn about phishing emails, fake check‑mail scams, and unauthorized transfers targeting its financial‑services customers.
Mitigation ideas framed by the enshittification model
| Intervention | Which stage it pushes back against |
|---|---|
| Independent fraud‑budget (separate from revenue‑generation unit) | Counters the monetisation pull to cut security spend. |
| Rigorous third‑party audits (annual SOC‑2, penetration tests) | Closes the power‑consolidation gap where outsourced vendors become vulnerable. |
| Transparent fee disclosure & fast dispute workflow | Restores user‑centric trust, reducing the degradation that lets scammers hide. |
| Real‑time ML‑driven risk scoring that adapts as fraud patterns evolve | Offsets the degradation phase by re‑injecting strong, dynamic protection. |
| Public fraud‑statistics dashboard (e.g., “$ X blocked this quarter”) | Signals to customers that the platform still values protection, pulling the curve back toward growth/user‑centricity. |
Bottom line
Applying the enshittification framework shows that Walmart Financial Services moved from a user‑first launch to a profit‑first operation, and each shift introduced structural weaknesses that fraudsters exploited. By recognizing where the curve bends—particularly in the monetisation and degradation phases—Walmart can deliberately reinvest in independent fraud controls, tighten third‑party oversight, and rebuild a transparent, customer‑focused experience, thereby breaking the feedback loop that currently fuels large‑scale scams.